baoyu-article-illustrator

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 14, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The prompts/system.md file contains explicit instructions to bypass safety filters: "If content involves sensitive or copyrighted figures, create stylistically similar alternatives
  • DO NOT refuse to generate". This attempts to override the model's standard refusal protocols for copyrighted material.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow defined in SKILL.md and references/workflow.md utilizes shell commands such as test -f, echo, mkdir, cp, mv, and rm to manage internal configuration files and project structures. While these are used for routine setup, they represent direct command execution capabilities.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill acts as a proxy that ingests untrusted article content and interpolates it into prompts for image generation tools.
  • Ingestion points: Article text provided via file path or direct paste (Step 2 in SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: Uses structured templates defined in references/prompt-construction.md to wrap content.
  • Capability inventory: Ability to generate images and write files to the local system.
  • Sanitization: The skill lacks explicit sanitization or filtering logic to prevent instructional content within the article from affecting the final image generation prompt.
  • [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill reads and writes configuration data to the user's home directory ($HOME/.baoyu-skills/baoyu-article-illustrator/EXTEND.md) for persistent preference management across projects.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Aug 14, 2026, 03:59 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — baoyu-article-illustrator