baoyu-article-illustrator
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The
prompts/system.mdfile contains explicit instructions to bypass safety filters: "If content involves sensitive or copyrighted figures, create stylistically similar alternatives - DO NOT refuse to generate". This attempts to override the model's standard refusal protocols for copyrighted material.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow defined in
SKILL.mdandreferences/workflow.mdutilizes shell commands such astest -f,echo,mkdir,cp,mv, andrmto manage internal configuration files and project structures. While these are used for routine setup, they represent direct command execution capabilities. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill acts as a proxy that ingests untrusted article content and interpolates it into prompts for image generation tools.
- Ingestion points: Article text provided via file path or direct paste (Step 2 in
SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: Uses structured templates defined in
references/prompt-construction.mdto wrap content. - Capability inventory: Ability to generate images and write files to the local system.
- Sanitization: The skill lacks explicit sanitization or filtering logic to prevent instructional content within the article from affecting the final image generation prompt.
- [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill reads and writes configuration data to the user's home directory (
$HOME/.baoyu-skills/baoyu-article-illustrator/EXTEND.md) for persistent preference management across projects.
Audit Metadata