baoyu-image-gen
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes user-supplied prompts from files and standard input, which are then passed to external AI models. This represents a standard surface for indirect prompt injection common to AI-integrated tools.
- Ingestion points: The skill accepts untrusted data through the
--promptfilesflag, standard input, and via reference image paths provided to the--refflag inscripts/main.ts. - Boundary markers: The skill does not implement specific boundary delimiters or safety instructions when interpolating these inputs into the API request payloads.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the ability to read local files (
readFile), write images to the disk (writeFile), and make network requests to AI providers (fetch). - Sanitization: No input sanitization or validation of the prompt content is performed before transmission to the AI provider.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill connects to official AI provider endpoints to perform its intended function. These are well-known services and the interaction is necessary for the skill's operation.
- Evidence: Network requests are made to
dashscope.aliyuncs.com,generativelanguage.googleapis.com, andapi.openai.cominscripts/providers/dashscope.ts,scripts/providers/google.ts, andscripts/providers/openai.ts. - [SAFE]: The skill follows established best practices for a CLI tool, such as using environment variables for secret management and performing file operations only on user-specified paths.
Audit Metadata