baoyu-url-to-markdown
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill programmatically identifies and launches local browser executables (Chrome, Edge, or Chromium) using system-level commands to render webpages and extract their content.
- Evidence: Found in
scripts/cdp.tswithin thefindChromeExecutableandlaunchChromefunctions, which usenode:child_process.spawnto start the browser. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it fetches and parses arbitrary content from the public internet. A malicious website could include instructions intended to hijack the agent's logic when the resulting Markdown is reviewed.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context via the user-provided URL in
scripts/main.ts, which is rendered and extracted into HTML. - Boundary markers: None; the Markdown output is generated and saved without explicit isolation delimiters or warnings to the agent that the content is untrusted.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to write to the local filesystem (
node:fs/promises.writeFile) and execute local processes (node:child_process.spawn). - Sanitization: Content is processed through
@mozilla/readabilityandturndownfor structural cleanup, but these libraries do not filter for semantic prompt injection attacks. - [DATA_EXPOSURE_AND_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses sensitive system directories to manage a dedicated browser profile, potentially exposing the agent to broader filesystem data.
- Evidence:
scripts/paths.tscontains logic to resolve the user's application data root (e.g.,AppDataon Windows orLibrary/Application Supporton macOS) to store Chrome profile data.
Audit Metadata