baoyu-url-to-markdown

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 14, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill programmatically identifies and launches local browser executables (Chrome, Edge, or Chromium) using system-level commands to render webpages and extract their content.
  • Evidence: Found in scripts/cdp.ts within the findChromeExecutable and launchChrome functions, which use node:child_process.spawn to start the browser.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it fetches and parses arbitrary content from the public internet. A malicious website could include instructions intended to hijack the agent's logic when the resulting Markdown is reviewed.
  • Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context via the user-provided URL in scripts/main.ts, which is rendered and extracted into HTML.
  • Boundary markers: None; the Markdown output is generated and saved without explicit isolation delimiters or warnings to the agent that the content is untrusted.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to write to the local filesystem (node:fs/promises.writeFile) and execute local processes (node:child_process.spawn).
  • Sanitization: Content is processed through @mozilla/readability and turndown for structural cleanup, but these libraries do not filter for semantic prompt injection attacks.
  • [DATA_EXPOSURE_AND_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses sensitive system directories to manage a dedicated browser profile, potentially exposing the agent to broader filesystem data.
  • Evidence: scripts/paths.ts contains logic to resolve the user's application data root (e.g., AppData on Windows or Library/Application Support on macOS) to store Chrome profile data.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Aug 14, 2026, 03:59 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — baoyu-url-to-markdown