bilibili-downloader
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 11, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes external command-line utilities
yt-dlpandffmpegto download and process media files. These calls are made using list-based arguments which correctly prevent shell injection. - Evidence:
bili_download.py(lines 42, 69, 107, 142) andvocal_extract.py(lines 18, 41, 79). - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads media content from Bilibili servers. While it interacts with external URLs, this is the primary intended function of the skill.
- Evidence:
bili_download.py(line 148). - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill supports an optional
--cookiesflag to allowyt-dlpto read browser session data. This is used to authenticate with Bilibili for high-quality downloads but involves access to sensitive local browser storage. - Evidence:
bili_download.py(line 139) andSKILL.md(lines 47, 60). - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill represents a surface for indirect prompt injection as it ingests untrusted metadata (such as video titles and descriptions) from external Bilibili pages during the download process.
- Evidence:
bili_download.py(line 151). - Ingestion points: Video metadata fetched via
yt-dlpfrom the provided URL. - Boundary markers: None identified in the script output logic.
- Capability inventory: File system write access and command execution via
ffmpeg. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization of external metadata is performed before displaying it in the agent context.
Audit Metadata