bilibili-downloader

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 11, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes external command-line utilities yt-dlp and ffmpeg to download and process media files. These calls are made using list-based arguments which correctly prevent shell injection.
  • Evidence: bili_download.py (lines 42, 69, 107, 142) and vocal_extract.py (lines 18, 41, 79).
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads media content from Bilibili servers. While it interacts with external URLs, this is the primary intended function of the skill.
  • Evidence: bili_download.py (line 148).
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill supports an optional --cookies flag to allow yt-dlp to read browser session data. This is used to authenticate with Bilibili for high-quality downloads but involves access to sensitive local browser storage.
  • Evidence: bili_download.py (line 139) and SKILL.md (lines 47, 60).
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill represents a surface for indirect prompt injection as it ingests untrusted metadata (such as video titles and descriptions) from external Bilibili pages during the download process.
  • Evidence: bili_download.py (line 151).
  • Ingestion points: Video metadata fetched via yt-dlp from the provided URL.
  • Boundary markers: None identified in the script output logic.
  • Capability inventory: File system write access and command execution via ffmpeg.
  • Sanitization: No explicit sanitization of external metadata is performed before displaying it in the agent context.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 11, 2026, 01:39 AM