qinghu-detail-page-clone
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 11, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPERSISTENCEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PERSISTENCE]: The skill includes instructions to modify the
~/.bashrcshell profile to persistently add a custom Node.js installation directory to the systemPATHenvironment variable.\n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted user content that is interpolated into prompts for image generation.\n - Ingestion points: User-provided selling point text (卖点文案) and uploaded product/reference images (
uploadedImages) inSKILL.md.\n - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify the use of delimiters or 'ignore' instructions when incorporating user-supplied text into the model prompt.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill executes the
qhkitCLI tool, which performs network operations to external APIs and triggers image generation.\n - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of the user-provided text before it is interpolated into shell commands and prompts.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute shell commands to bootstrap the environment, including
npm install,tar, andmkdir. It also constructs shell commands by interpolating user-supplied text into a JSON string for theqhkittool, which presents a command injection risk if user input contains shell-sensitive characters like single quotes.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads the Node.js runtime fromnodejs.organd the@iqinghu/qhkitpackage from the NPM registry. These downloads originate from well-known services and the vendor's official package repository.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://nodejs.org/dist/v22.22.3/SHASUMS256.txt - DO NOT USE without thorough review
Audit Metadata