llm-fine-tuning-skill

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 13, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONNO_CODE
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructs the agent to ingest untrusted external data, creating an attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: In stages/01-investigation/investigation-guide.md, the agent is directed to read and analyze external source code, documentation, papers, and dataset manifests.
  • Boundary markers: The workflow templates (e.g., stages/01-investigation/investigation-notes-template.md) lack explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore or isolate potential prompts embedded within the ingested external content.
  • Capability inventory: The skill utilizes capabilities including file system modification (Stage 4) and command execution for training and evaluation (Stage 5), as documented in stages/04-implementation/implementation-template.md and stages/05-training-and-validation/training-validation-template.md.
  • Sanitization: There is no requirement or instruction for the agent to sanitize or validate retrieving content from external sources before it influences code generation or execution.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates the generation and subsequent execution of shell commands and scripts.
  • Evidence: stages/04-implementation/implementation-template.md tracks the creation and modification of scripts and configs in the Change Inventory, while stages/05-training-and-validation/training-validation-template.md records the exact commands executed for training and validation runs.
  • [NO_CODE]: The skill itself consists of Markdown guides and YAML configuration without containing executable scripts or binary files, though it instructs the agent to produce and run them.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Apr 13, 2026, 05:05 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — llm-fine-tuning-skill