setup-xhs-mcp
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 24, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads a Docker Compose configuration file from a third-party GitHub repository and points users to binary releases.
- Evidence:
wget https://raw.githubusercontent.com/xpzouying/xiaohongshu-mcp/main/docker/docker-compose.ymlinSKILL.md. - Evidence: Instructions to fetch binary URLs from
https://api.github.com/repos/xpzouying/xiaohongshu-mcp/releases/latest. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill guides the user to execute external code in the form of Docker containers and downloaded binaries from an unverified source.
- Evidence:
docker compose up -dpulls and runs images fromxpzouying/xiaohongshu-mcp. - Evidence: Step 2, Way 2: 'From GitHub Releases download... binary mode needs Chrome installed locally.'
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses shell commands for network checks, service management, and tool configuration.
- Evidence:
curl -so /dev/null http://localhost:18060/mcp && echo "running" || echo "not running". - Evidence:
claude mcp add xiaohongshu --transport http <地址>. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill reads and modifies sensitive configuration files, which could be an attack surface if external data sources are processed.
- Ingestion points: Reading and checking
~/.claude/settings.jsonand.claude/settings.jsoninSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: Absent.
- Capability inventory:
curl,wget,docker,claude(inSKILL.md). - Sanitization: Absent; the skill directly interpolates addresses into configuration files.
Audit Metadata