setup-xhs-mcp

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 24, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads a Docker Compose configuration file from a third-party GitHub repository and points users to binary releases.
  • Evidence: wget https://raw.githubusercontent.com/xpzouying/xiaohongshu-mcp/main/docker/docker-compose.yml in SKILL.md.
  • Evidence: Instructions to fetch binary URLs from https://api.github.com/repos/xpzouying/xiaohongshu-mcp/releases/latest.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill guides the user to execute external code in the form of Docker containers and downloaded binaries from an unverified source.
  • Evidence: docker compose up -d pulls and runs images from xpzouying/xiaohongshu-mcp.
  • Evidence: Step 2, Way 2: 'From GitHub Releases download... binary mode needs Chrome installed locally.'
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses shell commands for network checks, service management, and tool configuration.
  • Evidence: curl -so /dev/null http://localhost:18060/mcp && echo "running" || echo "not running".
  • Evidence: claude mcp add xiaohongshu --transport http <地址>.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill reads and modifies sensitive configuration files, which could be an attack surface if external data sources are processed.
  • Ingestion points: Reading and checking ~/.claude/settings.json and .claude/settings.json in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: Absent.
  • Capability inventory: curl, wget, docker, claude (in SKILL.md).
  • Sanitization: Absent; the skill directly interpolates addresses into configuration files.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Sep 24, 2026, 06:33 AM