aap-eda

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 30, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructions direct the user or agent to clone a specific repository from a personal GitHub account.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The installation process involves executing code from an unverified external source via uv run eda.py and pip install -e .. This represents a high-risk pattern as the source repository (sibilleb/AAP-Enterprise-MCP-Server) is not associated with a trusted organization or the skill author.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external data that could contain malicious instructions.
  • Ingestion points: Data is ingested through tools like list_activations, get_rulebook, and list_event_streams.
  • Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions or delimiters to isolate untrusted content from the agent's control flow.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to modify the environment by enabling, disabling, and restarting EDA activations.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of content validation or sanitization for the retrieved EDA rulebooks or stream data.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Jul 30, 2026, 04:29 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — aap-eda