aap-eda
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 30, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructions direct the user or agent to clone a specific repository from a personal GitHub account.
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The installation process involves executing code from an unverified external source via
uv run eda.pyandpip install -e .. This represents a high-risk pattern as the source repository (sibilleb/AAP-Enterprise-MCP-Server) is not associated with a trusted organization or the skill author. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external data that could contain malicious instructions.
- Ingestion points: Data is ingested through tools like
list_activations,get_rulebook, andlist_event_streams. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions or delimiters to isolate untrusted content from the agent's control flow.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to modify the environment by enabling, disabling, and restarting EDA activations.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of content validation or sanitization for the retrieved EDA rulebooks or stream data.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata