f5-troubleshoot
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and analyze data from F5 system logs via the
show_logs_tooland configuration details via thelist_tool. Since logs can contain content derived from external network traffic (such as HTTP headers or URIs), they represent a vector for indirect prompt injection. - Ingestion points: System logs accessed via
show_logs_tooland iRule/object configurations vialist_tool. - Boundary markers: The skill does not provide explicit delimiters or instructions to the agent to disregard potential commands found within the log data.
- Capability inventory: The agent has significant capabilities to modify system state, including
update_tool,create_tool, anddelete_tool. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of log data before it is presented to the agent for analysis.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions rely on executing shell commands that incorporate environment variables for critical components.
- Evidence: The skill uses the pattern
python3 $MCP_CALL "python3 -u $F5_MCP_SCRIPT"to invoke its tools. This execution flow depends on the safety of the scripts pointed to by$MCP_CALLand$F5_MCP_SCRIPT. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates the modification of iRules, which are Tcl scripts executed by the F5 BIG-IP system.
- Evidence: The
update_tooldocumentation provides examples of updating theapiAnonymousfield with Tcl code blocks (e.g., theuri_routingexample). The agent generates this logic and applies it to the infrastructure at runtime.
Audit Metadata