gait-session-tracking
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 2, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructions use highly directive language (e.g., "This skill is mandatory", "MUST begin", "No exceptions") to override standard agent autonomy and enforce a strict operational sequence.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill defines several tools that execute shell commands using environment variables (
$MCP_CALLand$GAIT_MCP_SCRIPT) to invoke its backend Python-based MCP server. This relies on the security and integrity of the execution environment provided by the platform. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests and stores potentially untrusted content from the user and the assistant via the
gait_record_turntool. This content is later displayed usinggait_logorgait_show, which could lead the agent to execute hidden instructions contained within historical logs. - Ingestion points: Parameters
user_textandassistant_textin thegait_record_turntool call. - Boundary markers: None are defined in the instructions for how the agent should interpret or display the retrieved log content.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to execute shell commands via the configured MCP wrapper.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of programmatic sanitization or escaping of the text stored in the audit logs; the documentation only suggests sanitizing artifact references manually.
Audit Metadata