gitlab-devops
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 18, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill invokes
npx -y @zereight/mcp-gitlabto download and run code from a community-managed repository at runtime. This pattern allows for the execution of external code that is not version-pinned or verified for integrity on the host system. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Dynamically fetches the
@zereight/mcp-gitlabtool from the public NPM registry during the initialization of the MCP server. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Spawns a local process via the shell to execute the
npxcommand for server communication over stdio. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains an indirect prompt injection surface where untrusted data could influence agent behavior.
- Ingestion points: Reads content from potentially untrusted sources including issue comments (
list_issue_comments), merge request details (get_merge_request), wiki pages (get_wiki_page), and repository files (get_file_content). - Boundary markers: There are no defined delimiters or instructions to treat data from the repository as untrusted, increasing the risk that the agent may follow instructions embedded in comments or files.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to sensitive write operations such as merging code (
merge_merge_request), triggering CI/CD pipelines (create_pipeline), and creating issues or releases. - Sanitization: The analysis found no evidence of sanitization or validation of the content retrieved from GitLab before it is processed by the agent.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata