gitlab-devops

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 18, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill invokes npx -y @zereight/mcp-gitlab to download and run code from a community-managed repository at runtime. This pattern allows for the execution of external code that is not version-pinned or verified for integrity on the host system.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Dynamically fetches the @zereight/mcp-gitlab tool from the public NPM registry during the initialization of the MCP server.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Spawns a local process via the shell to execute the npx command for server communication over stdio.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains an indirect prompt injection surface where untrusted data could influence agent behavior.
  • Ingestion points: Reads content from potentially untrusted sources including issue comments (list_issue_comments), merge request details (get_merge_request), wiki pages (get_wiki_page), and repository files (get_file_content).
  • Boundary markers: There are no defined delimiters or instructions to treat data from the repository as untrusted, increasing the risk that the agent may follow instructions embedded in comments or files.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has access to sensitive write operations such as merging code (merge_merge_request), triggering CI/CD pipelines (create_pipeline), and creating issues or releases.
  • Sanitization: The analysis found no evidence of sanitization or validation of the content retrieved from GitLab before it is processed by the agent.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
May 18, 2026, 04:21 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — gitlab-devops