memory
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 2, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPERSISTENCE
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill provides an attack surface for indirect prompt injection by storing operational facts, session summaries, and decisions in a persistent store without explicit sanitization or boundary markers.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the system through the
memory_record_fact,memory_store_session, andmemory_record_decisiontools. - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands are defined for the stored content.
- Capability inventory: The skill facilitates file system writes to
~/.openclaw/memory/and interacts with other components like GAIT and HEARTBEAT, potentially allowing stored malicious instructions to affect these integrations. - Sanitization: The instructions do not mention any sanitization or validation of the input data before it is persisted.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill documentation indicates that the first run will automatically download an embedding model (approximately 80MB) from an external source to enable semantic search capabilities.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The troubleshooting section includes commands that execute external tools, specifically
uvx --from netclaw-memory-mcp memory-mcp-server --helpandsqlite3for database verification. - [PERSISTENCE]: The skill is designed to maintain state across agent sessions by storing data in
~/.openclaw/memory/, which is a deliberate functional persistence mechanism.
Audit Metadata