n2n-federation
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 2, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPERSISTENCEPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes local Python scripts, specifically
scripts/in2n-services.pyandscripts/in2n-profiles.py, to manage the generation of system services and member profiles. - [PERSISTENCE]: The skill facilitates the creation and activation of
systemd --userservices withRestart=alwaysandenable --nowparameters to ensure that mesh daemons and agent components persist across reboots and terminal sessions. - [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: Through its service management scripts, the skill modifies system-level runtime configurations, including the application of kernel-level confinement such as
NoNewPrivilegesand systemd-based sandboxing. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill serves as an ingestion point for remote, untrusted data by processing peer capability inventories and RAG (Retrieval-Augmented Generation) collections.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the agent's context through capability inventories, federated knowledge queries (
n2n_knowledge_query), and the results of delegated tasks (n2n_delegate). - Boundary markers: The skill documentation explicitly instructs the agent to treat information advertised by peers as remote and untrusted, and it notes the presence of a DefenseClaw LLM guardrail proxy.
- Capability inventory: The skill provides access to high-impact capabilities such as remote tool execution (
n2n_invoke), asynchronous task delegation (n2n_delegate), and large-scale data replication (n2n_replicate). - Sanitization: Security controls include mutual consent requirements, out-of-band identity verification (AS and Router-ID), and continuous posture reporting to verify sandbox and audit integrity.
Audit Metadata