pagerduty-incidents
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 2, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents a surface for indirect prompt injection by ingesting untrusted data from PagerDuty incidents and notes while possessing tools that can modify external state.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the agent's context through the list_incidents, get_incident, and list_incident_notes tools as described in SKILL.md.
- Boundary markers: The skill does not implement delimiters or safety instructions to distinguish external content from agent instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill includes tools to modify data such as create_incident, manage_incidents, add_note_to_incident, and add_responders.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of external data retrieved from the PagerDuty API.
Audit Metadata