zscaler-zpa
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 2, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill interfaces with external Zscaler APIs, creating a potential attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Tools like
get_application_segment,list_access_policies, andget_app_connectorretrieve data from external environments into the agent's context (SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: The skill documentation lacks explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore commands that might be embedded in the retrieved API data.
- Capability inventory: The skill includes administrative write tools such as
create_application_segment,update_application_segment, anddelete_application_segment(SKILL.md). - Sanitization: No data validation or sanitization mechanisms for API responses are defined in the skill instructions.
Audit Metadata