adapt
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 2, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill employs tools designed to capture sensitive authentication and session data from a user's browser.
- Evidence: The documentation for
liberate_map_apisandliberate_probeexplicitly instructs the agent to capture 'Auth header patterns (X-*, Authorization, cookies)' and inspect 'window globals, localStorage, cookies' via a remote debugging port. - Evidence: The process requires the user to launch a browser with
--remote-debugging-port=9222and log in to the target platform, exposing the active session to the agent's tools. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requires broad tool access to modify the local environment and execute scripts.
- Evidence: The
allowed-toolslist includesBash,Read,Write, andEdit, which are used throughout the guide to scaffold new directories insrc/adapters/and modify core registration files likesrc/mcp-server.tsandsrc/ui/discover.tsx. - Evidence: Phase 4c instructs the agent to execute code via
npx tsx src/cli.tsfor manual verification of the new adapter. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill involves the automated processing of untrusted external content, creating a potential surface for indirect injection.
- Ingestion points: The
discoverandextractfunctions fetch HTML and JSON data from arbitrary live URLs provided by the user. - Boundary markers: No explicit boundary markers or instruction-guarding delimiters are specified for the code being generated.
- Capability inventory: The generated adapters have access to the extraction pipeline's tools, including browser launching via Playwright (
launchBrowser). - Sanitization: While the guide mentions sanitizing PII in test fixtures, it does not specify sanitization or validation routines for data processed during live extraction loops.
Audit Metadata