adapt

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 2, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill employs tools designed to capture sensitive authentication and session data from a user's browser.
  • Evidence: The documentation for liberate_map_apis and liberate_probe explicitly instructs the agent to capture 'Auth header patterns (X-*, Authorization, cookies)' and inspect 'window globals, localStorage, cookies' via a remote debugging port.
  • Evidence: The process requires the user to launch a browser with --remote-debugging-port=9222 and log in to the target platform, exposing the active session to the agent's tools.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requires broad tool access to modify the local environment and execute scripts.
  • Evidence: The allowed-tools list includes Bash, Read, Write, and Edit, which are used throughout the guide to scaffold new directories in src/adapters/ and modify core registration files like src/mcp-server.ts and src/ui/discover.tsx.
  • Evidence: Phase 4c instructs the agent to execute code via npx tsx src/cli.ts for manual verification of the new adapter.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill involves the automated processing of untrusted external content, creating a potential surface for indirect injection.
  • Ingestion points: The discover and extract functions fetch HTML and JSON data from arbitrary live URLs provided by the user.
  • Boundary markers: No explicit boundary markers or instruction-guarding delimiters are specified for the code being generated.
  • Capability inventory: The generated adapters have access to the extraction pipeline's tools, including browser launching via Playwright (launchBrowser).
  • Sanitization: While the guide mentions sanitizing PII in test fixtures, it does not specify sanitization or validation routines for data processed during live extraction loops.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Jul 2, 2026, 09:44 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — adapt