lynx-repair

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill represents an indirect prompt injection attack surface because it ingests untrusted data from GitHub pull request comments via the gh pr view --comments command.
  • Ingestion points: Pull request comments and review threads fetched in Phase 1 (SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit delimiters or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings for the agent when processing these comments.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has the capability to modify local files, execute git add, git commit, and use the gh api to post responses to the pull request thread (SKILL.md Phases 4 and 5).
  • Sanitization: No specific sanitization or validation of the comment content is performed before the agent uses it to decide on code fixes or commit messages.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes several local command-line tools to perform its tasks.
  • Evidence: Execution of gh (GitHub CLI) to view PRs and post reviews, git to stage and commit changes, and a custom CI tool gw to verify code changes.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill invokes pnpm install during the verification phase to synchronize dependencies.
  • Evidence: The command pnpm install is executed in the VERIFY phase to ensure the environment is ready for testing changes. This uses the well-known NPM registry service.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 9, 2026, 01:31 AM