autoresearch
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 30, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to read and "adopt mechanics (metric, commands, scopes, budgets, logging) verbatim" from a
program.mdfile located within the target repository. This creates a significant surface for indirect prompt injection where a malicious repository could dictate the shell commands the agent executes. - Ingestion points:
program.mdin the target repository;run.logcreated by the experiment command;results.tsvand/tmp/autoresearch-...mdledger files. - Boundary markers: None. The skill is explicitly instructed to adopt repo-provided configurations verbatim.
- Capability inventory: Shell command execution (
experiment command,extraction command), Git operations (git -C <repo>), and file system writes. - Sanitization: None. The skill relies on the AI to follow instructions without sanitizing the inputs from the repo or the log files.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes arbitrary shell commands provided either as user input or extracted from the repository's configuration. This includes the primary experiment command and the metric extraction command.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill orchestrates a loop where subagents generate code changes which are then automatically committed and executed. While the orchestrator tries to verify these changes against a "frozen scope," the automated execution of LLM-generated code in a shell environment is a high-capability risk.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill maintains a ledger and a narrative progress file that include descriptions and "suggested next experiments" generated by LLM subagents. Because these files are read back by the orchestrator and subsequent subagents to guide the loop, a subagent could theoretically inject instructions to manipulate future iterations of the research.
Audit Metadata