video-analyzer
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 30, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The
setup.shscript generates asitecustomize.pyfile within the Python virtual environment'ssite-packages. This script dynamically patchestorch.loadto setweights_only=False. This effectively disables a security feature in PyTorch designed to prevent arbitrary code execution when loading untrusted model files, although it is intended here to ensure compatibility with specific diarization models.- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads AI models from HuggingFace (a well-known repository) during the transcription and diarization phases. It also usesyt-dlpto download video content from YouTube when a URL is provided by the user.- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of system shell commands and subprocesses to run media utilities includingffmpeg,ffprobe,yt-dlp,pandoc, andweasyprint. It also executes Python scripts for transcription and frame analysis.- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Theingest.shscript is configured to access local browser cookies (defaulting to Google Chrome) viayt-dlp. This is used to authenticate with YouTube for downloading restricted or bot-protected content, but it involves reading sensitive local data from the user's browser profile.- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data from YouTube videos and local files. It transcribes audio and extracts visual frames which are then processed by the AI agent. Ingestion points: Video URLs or local files processed viaingest.shandtranscribe.sh. Boundary markers: None identified for transcript or frame context injection into the main prompt. Capability inventory: Subprocess execution (ffmpeg,yt-dlp), file system writes, and PDF report generation. Sanitization: No explicit sanitization of transcribed text or visual metadata before it is presented to the agent for analysis.
Audit Metadata