capacitor-apple-review-preflight

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 12, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses dynamic context injection (!command syntax) in SKILL.md to execute shell commands when the skill is loaded.
  • Evidence: It runs a Node.js one-liner (node -e "...") to parse the local package.json and filter for specific dependencies (Capacitor, Firebase, Sentry, etc.).
  • Evidence: It executes a find command to locate project-specific files like Info.plist, PrivacyInfo.xcprivacy, and capacitor.config.json.
  • Context: While these commands are functional for the audit, executing complex scripts at load time is a medium-risk pattern.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and analyze untrusted data from a user's local project environment.
  • Ingestion points: The agent is instructed to read package.json, Info.plist, capacitor.config.*, and PrivacyInfo.xcprivacy (File: SKILL.md, Step 3).
  • Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions or delimiters provided to the agent to treat the content of these files as data rather than instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill assumes the agent can execute shell commands like asc, ffmpeg, codesign, and plutil (File: references/rules/metadata/accurate_metadata.md, references/rules/entitlements/unused_entitlements.md).
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or validation logic is defined for the ingested file content.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions frequently suggest the use of external CLI tools to perform technical audits.
  • Evidence: Mentions asc (App Store Connect CLI), ffmpeg for video frame analysis, plutil for property list parsing, and codesign for entitlement verification.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Jul 12, 2026, 07:38 AM