capacitor-apple-review-preflight
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 12, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses dynamic context injection (
!commandsyntax) inSKILL.mdto execute shell commands when the skill is loaded. - Evidence: It runs a Node.js one-liner (
node -e "...") to parse the localpackage.jsonand filter for specific dependencies (Capacitor, Firebase, Sentry, etc.). - Evidence: It executes a
findcommand to locate project-specific files likeInfo.plist,PrivacyInfo.xcprivacy, andcapacitor.config.json. - Context: While these commands are functional for the audit, executing complex scripts at load time is a medium-risk pattern.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and analyze untrusted data from a user's local project environment.
- Ingestion points: The agent is instructed to read
package.json,Info.plist,capacitor.config.*, andPrivacyInfo.xcprivacy(File: SKILL.md, Step 3). - Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions or delimiters provided to the agent to treat the content of these files as data rather than instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill assumes the agent can execute shell commands like
asc,ffmpeg,codesign, andplutil(File: references/rules/metadata/accurate_metadata.md, references/rules/entitlements/unused_entitlements.md). - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation logic is defined for the ingested file content.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions frequently suggest the use of external CLI tools to perform technical audits.
- Evidence: Mentions
asc(App Store Connect CLI),ffmpegfor video frame analysis,plutilfor property list parsing, andcodesignfor entitlement verification.
Audit Metadata