capacitor-mcp
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 12, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill facilitates downloading the
awesome-ionic-mcpserver from the NPM registry and fetching documentation from various external sources. - Evidence: The setup instructions utilize
npxto download and run the MCP server. - Evidence: Documentation is retrieved from external domains such as ionicframework.com, capacitorjs.com, and capgo.app.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Provides tools for an AI agent to execute local CLI commands for project management, builds, and platform synchronization.
- Evidence: Tools like
ionic_build,capacitor_sync,capacitor_run, andionic_generateact as wrappers for system shell commands. - Evidence: The
ionic_config_settool allows modification of project-level configuration. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Utilizes the
npxutility to execute remote packages at runtime. - Evidence: Configuration examples for Claude Desktop, Cline, and Cursor show execution of
awesome-ionic-mcpvia thenpxcommand. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an attack surface for indirect prompt injection because it ingests data from external websites and passes it to an agent with significant system capabilities.
- Ingestion points: Data is ingested via
get_component_api,get_official_plugin_api, andget_plugin_apifrom external web documentation. - Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands are defined.
- Capability inventory: The skill exposes high-impact CLI commands including
ionic_start,ionic_build,capacitor_run, andcapacitor_add. - Sanitization: There is no documented mechanism for sanitizing or escaping the content retrieved from external sources before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata