community-builder
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill inherently possesses a broad attack surface for indirect prompt injection by ingesting untrusted data from multiple external sources.
- Ingestion points: Processes member introductions, support questions in Discord/Slack, GitHub issues/discussions, and Reddit/LinkedIn posts (identified in
SKILL.mdPhases 1, 2, 3, and 4). - Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not specify the use of delimiters or 'ignore embedded instructions' warnings when processing member content.
- Capability inventory: The agent can post responses to social platforms and route extracted data to internal systems such as
lead-routingandcustomer-intel(SKILL.mdPhase 4). - Sanitization: Absent. There are no instructions for sanitizing, escaping, or validating external community content before interpolation into prompts or downstream routing.
Audit Metadata