amq-remote
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 28, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONPERSISTENCE
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the user to install tools from
avivsinai/tap/amqvia Homebrew. These are vendor-owned resources belonging to the skill's author. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes several CLI tools (
amq-remote,amq-acp,amq) and executes shell commands to configure the environment and handle messages. - [PERSISTENCE]: The skill provides instructions to run
amq-remote claude install-stop-hook, which modifies the~/.claude/settings.jsonconfiguration file to install a persistent stop hook for the agent environment. This is a documented step for integration. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's primary function is to act as a receiver for external commands sent via the Buzz messaging system, which introduces an injection risk.
- Ingestion points: Incoming messages from the user
buzzwith the subject "Buzz DM" are processed from the agent's AMQ inbox. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify any delimiters or safety prompts to isolate the external message content from the agent's internal logic.
- Capability inventory: The agent is explicitly told to "Do the work" requested in the message, which grants the external sender access to the agent's full range of tools and command execution capabilities.
- Sanitization: No sanitization, validation, or filtering of the incoming message content is described.
Audit Metadata