amq-cli
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 17, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill recommends installing its CLI tool using
curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/avivsinai/agent-message-queue/main/scripts/install.sh | bashinSKILL.md. This pattern executes unverified remote code directly in a shell environment.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Instructions inSKILL.mdinclude flags like--dangerously-skip-permissionsand--dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandboxwhich are designed to override agent security boundaries and safety filters.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Documentation promoteseval \"$(amq env ...)\"inSKILL.md, which executes shell commands generated by theamqbinary. This creates a risk of arbitrary command execution if the binary's output is compromised.\n- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill facilitates data movement across project and session boundaries (references/cross-project.md). When used with sandbox-bypass flags, this poses a risk of unauthorized data exfiltration.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill relies on external code and configuration from a GitHub repository (avivsinai/agent-message-queue) not recognized as a trusted organization.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a surface for indirect prompt injection.\n - Ingestion points: Ingests data from mailbox files via
amq drainandamq watch.\n - Boundary markers: Header validation is mentioned, but no body delimiters or warnings are instructed.\n
- Capability inventory: Access to shell execution and sandbox bypass flags.\n
- Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization for the message body is provided.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/avivsinai/agent-message-queue/main/scripts/install.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata