x-bookmarks-fetcher
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 13, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/auth.mjsuseschild_process.execFileto launch the system's default web browser (viaopen,start, orxdg-open) for the purpose of completing the OAuth 2.0 authorization flow. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The script
scripts/fetch.mjsperforms HTTPS GET requests to official X API domains (api.twitter.comandapi.x.com) to retrieve bookmark metadata and download media assets (images and videos). - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: No unauthorized data exfiltration was detected. Sensitive credentials, including the Client Secret and generated OAuth tokens, are stored only on the local machine in
.envand.tokens.jsonfiles with restrictive permissions (chmod 600). - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from the X API (tweet text) and writes it into local Markdown and text files. While these files are not directly fed back into the agent by the skill itself, they lack boundary delimiters, creating a potential surface for indirect prompt injection if a user manually provides the output files to an LLM in a subsequent session.
Audit Metadata