ai-archive

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 9, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute several shell commands (e.g., git ls-files, mv, git mv) using the <name> variable, which is derived from the user-supplied $ARGUMENTS. In Step 6, the command git ls-files --error-unmatch "<output_root>/<name>" uses double quotes, which in most shell environments still allows for command substitution (e.g., $(...)) or variable expansion. If a folder name on disk or a user-provided argument contains shell metacharacters, it could lead to arbitrary command execution within the agent's environment.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from the local filesystem and interpolates it into manifest files, creating a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: User input through $ARGUMENTS (SKILL.md Step 2), folder names within the output_root (SKILL.md Step 2), and contents of the ## Status and ## Description sections in project README.md files (SKILL.md Step 3, 7, and 8).
  • Boundary markers: The skill includes logic to prevent path traversal (e.g., checking for .. in Step 2) and restricts operations to an output_root. However, it lacks instructions for the agent to sanitize or ignore potential AI instructions embedded within the folder names or README descriptions before they are processed and written to the manifest files.
  • Capability inventory: The agent is granted capabilities to execute shell commands (mkdir, mv, git), read various local files (.ai-skills.toml, README.md, AGENTS.md), and perform file writes/edits on manifest files.
  • Sanitization: Beyond path validation, there is no content-level sanitization or escaping performed on the strings extracted from project files before they are transplanted into the README.md manifests.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Nov 9, 2026, 02:43 PM