aidlc-implement
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 20, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill contains explicit instructions to bypass tool security and authorization prompts in the Kiro CLI environment. In both
references/autonomous-mode.mdandreferences/parallel-mode.md, it directs the user to run/tools trust-allor/tools trust read write shell. This removes safety constraints and allows the agent to execute arbitrary shell commands and file operations without user confirmation. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill automates the installation of third-party dependencies using shell commands (e.g.,
npm install,pip install) with non-interactive flags like-y,--yes, and--non-interactiveas seen inreferences/autonomous-mode.md. Combined with the instruction to disable security prompts, this facilitates the silent introduction of external code into the local environment. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface by ingesting and acting upon data from untrusted external sources.
- Ingestion points: Reads implementation tasks from
tasks.md, architecture specs fromdesign.md, and documentation via web search (actions/standard-mode.md). - Boundary markers: While it uses process-based instructions (e.g., "Follow design documents precisely"), it lacks technical delimiters or sanitization logic to prevent malicious instructions embedded in these documents from influencing agent behavior.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to write to the file system, execute shell commands, and dispatch sub-agents (
invokeSubAgent,Agent). - Sanitization: No validation or filtering is performed on the content of design documents or external resources before they are used to guide code generation and execution.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata