skill-creator

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 13, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the Python subprocess module to execute the claude CLI tool. This is performed across several scripts (run_eval.py, improve_description.py, run_loop.py) to test skill triggering and generate improved skill descriptions based on model output.
  • Evidence: subprocess.Popen calls in run_eval.py and subprocess.run calls in improve_description.py and generate_review.py.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The evaluation results viewer (eval-viewer/viewer.html) loads the SheetJS library from a remote CDN (cdn.sheetjs.com) to enable Excel file rendering in the browser.
  • Evidence: <script src="https://cdn.sheetjs.com/xlsx-0.20.3/package/dist/xlsx.full.min.js" ...> in eval-viewer/viewer.html.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests untrusted data from user-defined eval queries and skill instructions, which are then interpolated into prompts for grader, analyzer, and optimizer subagents.
  • Ingestion points: evals/evals.json and the SKILL.md file of the skill being developed.
  • Boundary markers: The skill uses XML-style tags (e.g., <skill_content>) to delimit untrusted data within its internal prompts, which provides some mitigation but does not fully prevent adversarial influence.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to write files to the .claude/commands/ directory and execute the claude CLI tool via subprocess.
  • Sanitization: Content is escaped using html.escape for the HTML reports, but the raw instructional data is passed to the LLM for processing without further structural validation.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Aug 13, 2026, 03:19 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — skill-creator