skill-creator
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 13, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the Python
subprocessmodule to execute theclaudeCLI tool. This is performed across several scripts (run_eval.py,improve_description.py,run_loop.py) to test skill triggering and generate improved skill descriptions based on model output. - Evidence:
subprocess.Popencalls inrun_eval.pyandsubprocess.runcalls inimprove_description.pyandgenerate_review.py. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The evaluation results viewer (
eval-viewer/viewer.html) loads the SheetJS library from a remote CDN (cdn.sheetjs.com) to enable Excel file rendering in the browser. - Evidence:
<script src="https://cdn.sheetjs.com/xlsx-0.20.3/package/dist/xlsx.full.min.js" ...>ineval-viewer/viewer.html. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests untrusted data from user-defined eval queries and skill instructions, which are then interpolated into prompts for grader, analyzer, and optimizer subagents.
- Ingestion points:
evals/evals.jsonand theSKILL.mdfile of the skill being developed. - Boundary markers: The skill uses XML-style tags (e.g.,
<skill_content>) to delimit untrusted data within its internal prompts, which provides some mitigation but does not fully prevent adversarial influence. - Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to write files to the
.claude/commands/directory and execute theclaudeCLI tool via subprocess. - Sanitization: Content is escaped using
html.escapefor the HTML reports, but the raw instructional data is passed to the LLM for processing without further structural validation.
Audit Metadata