seenry-apps

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 28, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script scripts/independent_flow_gate.py uses subprocess.run to execute the codex CLI. This involves executing external binaries based on user-provided arguments (e.g., --codex-bin), which is a sensitive operation that could be abused if the environment is not secured.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The instructions in SKILL.md and several scripts reference and execute code located in relative parent directories (for example, node ../seenry/scripts/pick.mjs, python3 ../seenry/scripts/palette.py, and python3 ../seenry-motion/scripts/video_frames.py). This creates a dependency on an external filesystem state and could lead to unauthorized code execution if the surrounding environment is compromised.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process data from external mobile applications and user journeys via research tools like search_app_flows and get_app_flow to inform its design tasks.
  • Ingestion points: Data from external apps enters the agent's context through the Seenry MCP tool outputs described in the Workflow and Research sections.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not define clear delimiters or include warnings for the agent to ignore potentially malicious embedded instructions in the researched app content.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities including command execution (via the codex CLI), file writing in the workspace, and image generation via external scripts.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, filtering, or validation of the content retrieved from external app flows before it is used to drive the agent's logic and design decisions.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Oct 28, 2026, 04:21 PM