seenry-apps
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 28, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/independent_flow_gate.pyusessubprocess.runto execute thecodexCLI. This involves executing external binaries based on user-provided arguments (e.g.,--codex-bin), which is a sensitive operation that could be abused if the environment is not secured. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The instructions in
SKILL.mdand several scripts reference and execute code located in relative parent directories (for example,node ../seenry/scripts/pick.mjs,python3 ../seenry/scripts/palette.py, andpython3 ../seenry-motion/scripts/video_frames.py). This creates a dependency on an external filesystem state and could lead to unauthorized code execution if the surrounding environment is compromised. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process data from external mobile applications and user journeys via research tools like
search_app_flowsandget_app_flowto inform its design tasks. - Ingestion points: Data from external apps enters the agent's context through the Seenry MCP tool outputs described in the
WorkflowandResearchsections. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define clear delimiters or include warnings for the agent to ignore potentially malicious embedded instructions in the researched app content.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities including command execution (via the
codexCLI), file writing in the workspace, and image generation via external scripts. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, filtering, or validation of the content retrieved from external app flows before it is used to drive the agent's logic and design decisions.
Audit Metadata