seenry
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 29, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONPERSISTENCE
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The script
scripts/image.mjsreads and copies authentication files (auth.json,config.toml) from the user's~/.codexdirectory to a temporary folder to authenticate thecodexCLI for image generation. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Project briefs, which may contain sensitive internal requirements, are sent to the external domain
https://mcp.seenry.designviascripts/research.mjsto retrieve design research data. This domain is not on the provided whitelist. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from a
BRIEF.mdfile and interpolates it directly into persona-based prompts for design critique and motion judging inscripts/critic.mjsandscripts/choreography.mjs. - Ingestion points:
BRIEF.md(read inscripts/check.mjs,scripts/critic.mjs,scripts/choreography.mjs). - Boundary markers: Minimal to none; the brief content is concatenated into instructions.
- Capability inventory: File system access, execution of local binaries (
spawn), and network requests (fetch). - Sanitization: No escaping or validation is performed on the ingested brief content.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on executing external system binaries.
scripts/model_cli.mjsuses thewhichcommand to locate and spawn arbitrarycodexorclaudebinaries found on the host system path. - [PERSISTENCE]: The script
scripts/history.mjscreates and writes to~/.config/seenry/history.jsonto maintain design identity state across multiple independent project sessions.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata