dev-journal
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_CONTEXT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data which could potentially contain malicious instructions if the git environment or user arguments are manipulated.
- Ingestion points: The skill retrieves the current git branch name via
git branch --show-currentand accepts user-provided text through the$ARGUMENTSvariable. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or warnings to the agent to ignore instructions embedded within the branch name or user arguments.
- Capability inventory: The skill has file system access (
Write,Edit,Glob) and limited shell execution capabilities (Bash) which could be targeted by an injection attack. - Sanitization: The skill does not perform escaping or validation on the branch name or
$ARGUMENTSbefore writing them to the journal file. - [DYNAMIC_CONTEXT_INJECTION]: The skill utilizes dynamic markers to execute shell commands automatically when the skill is loaded.
- Evidence: Found
!git branch --show-currentand!date '+%F %H:%M'in the Context section ofSKILL.md. - Analysis: These commands are used to pull metadata into the agent's context. In this instance, the commands are benign and purpose-built for the journal's functionality.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill frontmatter explicitly restricts shell execution to specific, low-risk commands.
- Evidence:
allowed-toolsincludesBash(date *),Bash(git branch *), andBash(mkdir *). - Analysis: This demonstrates a principle of least privilege by scoping the
Bashtool to only the specific commands required for journal creation and time-stamping.
Audit Metadata