intlayer-cli
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Several CLI commands described in the documentation, such as
build,watch,editor, andlive, support a--withargument. This flag allows the execution of arbitrary shell commands in parallel with the Intlayer process (e.g.,npx intlayer build --with "next dev"). - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The
logincommand initiates a local HTTP server on a random port to capture sensitive credentials (Client ID and Client Secret) from the Intlayer CMS via the browser. Additionally, the documentation instructs users on how to manage these secrets using environment variables and provides an--api-keyflag for direct integration with AI providers. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The
fill,doc-translate, anddoc-reviewcommands ingest local project content (dictionaries and documentation files) to process them through external AI services (OpenAI, DeepSeek). This creates an attack surface where malicious instructions embedded in the processed files could potentially influence the AI's output or the agent's behavior. - Ingestion points: Reads
src/**/*.content.{ts|js|mjs|cjs|json}and documentation files (.md,.mdx). - Boundary markers: No explicit boundary markers or sanitization steps are documented for the content sent to AI providers.
- Capability inventory: File system read/write, network communication (API calls), and parallel command execution.
- Sanitization: Static documentation does not mention content escaping or instruction filtering before processing.
- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The
initcommand programmatically modifies project-level configuration files, including.gitignore,tsconfig.json,vite.config.ts, andnext.config.js. While intended for setup, this capability allows the tool to alter the project's build and security settings.
Audit Metadata