fig1-analyze
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/extract_pdf_figures.pyinvokes local PDF processing tools such aspdfimagesandpdftoppmusingsubprocess.run. The implementation uses list-based arguments to prevent shell injection and verifies the presence of binaries viashutil.whichbefore execution.\n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data from academic manuscripts and code repositories, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.\n - Ingestion points: External content is ingested via
references/paper.md(manuscript text) andreferences/repo.md(repository source code).\n - Boundary markers: The
references/missing-info-policy.mdfile defines a policy for handling incomplete evidence, instructing the agent to use placeholders (e.g.,[module_name]) and label inferred claims, which helps prevent the blind execution of embedded instructions.\n - Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to read local files and write extracted images and JSON reports to the local filesystem via the
extract_pdf_figures.pyscript.\n - Sanitization: The skill instructions explicitly forbid the invention of modules or architecture layers not present in the source, serving as a logic-level check against malicious data manipulation.
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