setup-check
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests data from several external and potentially untrusted sources during its audit process. Ingestion points: It reads all rule files in
~/.claude/rules/*.md, frontmatter from skill directories in~/.agents/skills/, and hook metadata fromhooks.json. Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify any delimiters or explicit 'ignore embedded instructions' warnings for the agent when processing these files. Capability inventory: The skill has high-privilege capabilities including executing shell commands (claude,npm) and modifying system configuration files via theupdate-configskill. Sanitization: No sanitization, escaping, or validation logic is defined for the content ingested from the filesystem before it enters the agent's context. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes several shell-based tools to perform its audit, including
claude --version,npm view, andclaude plugin marketplace update. It also constructs and runsclaude plugins updatecommands using identifiers retrieved from theinstalled_plugins.jsonfile. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill performs network operations to check for updates and refresh registries. It fetches package metadata for
@anthropic-ai/claude-codefrom the official npm registry and uses theclaudeCLI to synchronize with external plugin marketplaces.
Audit Metadata