clarifying-assumptions
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 24, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted input from ticket manifests, task plans, and codebase source files that could contain malicious instructions.
- Ingestion points: Processes
MAIN_PLAN_FILE, various artifact files (e.g.,docs/<KEY>-stage-1-detailed.md), and local project files during codebase verification. - Boundary markers: The instructions in
SKILL.mdandsubagents/critique-analyzer.mdexplicitly mandate that external content and fetched pages be treated as reference data only, stating they must not override the skill's authoritative instructions or host runtime rules. - Capability inventory: Possesses filesystem read/write capabilities (restricted to markdown orchestration artifacts) and network fetch capabilities for evidence gathering.
- Sanitization: The architecture uses subagent isolation to compartmentalize data processing, and output artifacts are validated against specific markdown templates before being finalized.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches content from external URLs to provide rationale and evidence for its critiques.
- The network activity is primarily guided by a source map in
references/external-sources.mdwhich points to well-known technical and design thinking resources (e.g., Anthropic, Atlassian, Thoughtworks, Nielsen Norman Group). - The
critique-analyzersubagent may fetch official project documentation for named dependencies discovered within the user's repository, but these are handled as reference data for evidence-based decision making.
Audit Metadata