planning-task-execution
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external task plans and codebase content, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious instructions could be embedded in the data being analyzed.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads task definitions from
docs/<KEY>-tasks.mdand inspects the project codebase across all four subagent stages. - Boundary markers: The instructions include explicit defensive prompts to treat task plans, snapshots, code, and command output strictly as data and never as instructions that can override the skill's scope.
- Capability inventory: The skill is restricted to reading local project files and writing four specific Markdown artifacts within the
docs/directory. It is explicitly forbidden from calling GitHub/Jira APIs, executing arbitrary shell commands, or performing network exfiltration of ingested data. - Sanitization: The skill relies on prompt-level constraints and structured artifact templates to ensure that processed content does not influence the agent's control flow or expand its mutation scope.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches methodology guidance from established industry sources and official documentation to inform its planning recommendations.
- Evidence: The
references/external-sources.mdfile defines a whitelist of external URLs, including official GitHub and Atlassian documentation, as well as respected technical resources from Martin Fowler, Sandi Metz, and Cucumber.io. - Context: These fetches are limited to two pages per stage and are used solely for conceptual methodology (e.g., Given/When/Then framing or YAGNI principles) rather than executing remote code or performing tracker transport.
Audit Metadata