extract-blockchain-media
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 8, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/extract.tsis vulnerable to shell command injection because it useschild_process.execwith unsanitized user inputs.\n - Evidence: The
txidargument is only validated for its length (64 characters), which can be bypassed using shell subshells or backticks within a 64-character payload.\n - Evidence: The
outputDirargument is resolved to an absolute path but is then concatenated into a command string within double quotes without escaping. This allows an attacker to inject commands by including a double quote and shell metacharacters in the directory path.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs users to install an external CLI tooltxexusingbun add -g txex. This is an unverified third-party dependency.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface through the ingestion of untrusted blockchain data.\n - Ingestion points: Data is retrieved from the BSV blockchain as described in
SKILL.mdand processed byscripts/extract.ts.\n - Boundary markers: Absent. There are no delimiters or instructions provided to the agent to treat extracted content as untrusted data.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill uses
Bash(bun:*)and executes filesystem and shell commands inscripts/extract.ts.\n - Sanitization: Absent. Extracted media and text data are not sanitized before being saved or presented to the agent.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata