generate-image
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data in the form of user-supplied text prompts and reference images, creating a standard surface for indirect injection.
- Ingestion points: Raw user prompts and local image files provided via the
--inputflag inscripts/generate.ts. - Boundary markers: The
references/prompt-guide.mdinstructs the agent to rewrite and narrate prompts, providing a manual normalization layer, though no programmatic delimiters are enforced. - Capability inventory: The skill invokes external AI APIs (Google, OpenAI, xAI), performs file system writes for image output, and executes sub-scripts via the
bunruntime. - Sanitization: Relies on the agent's pre-generation rewriting and the safety filters implemented by the third-party image generation providers.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The main generation script employs dynamic module loading to resolve the plugin's root directory across different installation environments.
- Evidence:
scripts/generate.tsusesimport()with computed paths to findresolve-root.tsand utility modules by searching the local file system (e.g.,~/.claude/plugins/installed_plugins.json). This behavior is consistent with the vendor's architectural patterns for path resolution and does not involve untrusted data.
Audit Metadata