generate-video
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data provided by the user, specifically text prompts and images (starting frames and reference images), which are expanded by the agent and then sent to external AI generation APIs such as Gemini, xAI, and Replicate. The generated output is written to the local filesystem.\n
- Ingestion points: Positional command-line arguments and file path flags (
--input,--ref,--last-frame) processed byscripts/generate.ts.\n - Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions provide guidance for prompt rewriting but do not specify delimiters or instructions for the agent to ignore potentially malicious content embedded in the user input.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill can perform network requests to multiple AI providers and write
.mp4and.pngfiles to the filesystem.\n - Sanitization: The script does not perform technical sanitization (such as character filtering or escaping) on the expanded prompt string before it is passed to the generation SDKs.\n- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/generate.tsuses dynamicimport()calls to load internal modules based on paths calculated at runtime.\n - Runtime loading: A resolution helper function locates the plugin's installation root by reading platform-specific configuration files (e.g.,
~/.claude/plugins/installed_plugins.json) and scanning local cache directories, then dynamically imports logic from files likeutils.ts,shared.ts, andproviders/xai.tsusing the resolved path.
Audit Metadata