front-desk
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONOBFUSCATION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references multiple external resources for installation and configuration.
- Instructs the agent to fetch and follow instructions from
https://bopen.ai/install/grok-bot.md. - Provides installation paths for plugins from the vendor (
b-open-io) and a third-party repository (coreyhaines31/marketingskills). - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Contains instructions for users or agents to execute CLI commands such as
/plugin install,codex plugin marketplace add,grok plugin install, andbunx skills add. These commands facilitate the download and installation of external code packages. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: As a routing service, the skill is designed to process user requests and delegate them to specialized subagents.
- Ingestion points: User queries describing tasks or asking for specific specialists (e.g., 'who should I talk to about Z?').
- Boundary markers: No explicit markers or instructions are provided to delimit or sanitize user input before it is passed to subagents.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes the
Agenttool in Claude Code and custom agent delegation in Codex to spawn new agent contexts. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or safety warnings regarding the interpolation of user-provided task descriptions into subagent prompts.
- [OBFUSCATION]: The file
.clawnet/unsigned-skill.jsonincludes aopReturnHexfield containing a large hex-encoded payload. Technical analysis indicates this encodes the skill's own metadata and instructions, likely used by the platform for provenance and verification purposes rather than to hide malicious intent.
Audit Metadata