generative-ui
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 7, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONOBFUSCATION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions in
SKILL.mddirect users to add components usingbunx --bun shadcn@latest add Boring-Software-Inc/dither-kit/<component>. This command fetches and executes code from a repository belonging to an unverified third-party entity (Boring-Software-Inc), posing a risk of supply chain attack or execution of untrusted code. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's primary function is to generate UI specifications from external data sources such as user preferences and application state (as seen in
README.mdandSKILL.md). This ingestion of untrusted data into the agent's generation pipeline represents an indirect prompt injection surface. While the skill emphasizes the use of Zod schemas for structural validation, it lacks explicit boundary markers or instructions to ignore potential commands embedded within the data fields (e.g., titles or labels) that the agent processes. - [OBFUSCATION]: The
.clawnet/unsigned-skill.jsonfile contains a large hex-encoded string in theopReturnHexfield. Analysis indicates this encodes the skill's own instructions and metadata, likely for blockchain-based verification using the B-protocol prefix19HxigV4QyBv3tHpQVcUEQyq1pzZVdoAutM. Although consistent with certain platform standards, it constitutes a form of content encoding that hides instructions from plain-text inspection.
Audit Metadata