reinforce-skills

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill generates and injects forceful, imperative directives into project files (e.g., STOP. You WILL forget skill names...) designed to override agent behavior and prevent context drift.
  • [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The inventory workflow (Step 1) involves reading directory listings from local paths such as ~/.claude/skills/ and ~/.claude/plugins/cache/*/agents/ to identify available tools.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references research findings and tool resources from Vercel's official blog and documentation.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill optionally executes npx @next/codemod@canary, which downloads and runs code from Vercel's official package registry at runtime for Next.js projects.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses shell commands including git log to analyze recent project history, ls for inventorying local directories, and npx for framework utility execution.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an attack surface for indirect injection by processing untrusted data from the local project environment.
  • Ingestion points: Project configuration files (e.g., package.json, go.mod, Cargo.toml), CLAUDE.md, and recent git commit history via git log.
  • Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters are specified to isolate untrusted data during subagent analysis.
  • Capability inventory: Shell command execution (git, npx), file writing (CLAUDE.md), and delegation to subagents.
  • Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or filtering of ingested project data is described.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 9, 2026, 03:41 AM