reinforce-skills
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill generates and injects forceful, imperative directives into project files (e.g.,
STOP. You WILL forget skill names...) designed to override agent behavior and prevent context drift. - [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The inventory workflow (Step 1) involves reading directory listings from local paths such as
~/.claude/skills/and~/.claude/plugins/cache/*/agents/to identify available tools. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references research findings and tool resources from Vercel's official blog and documentation.
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill optionally executes
npx @next/codemod@canary, which downloads and runs code from Vercel's official package registry at runtime for Next.js projects. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses shell commands including
git logto analyze recent project history,lsfor inventorying local directories, andnpxfor framework utility execution. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an attack surface for indirect injection by processing untrusted data from the local project environment.
- Ingestion points: Project configuration files (e.g.,
package.json,go.mod,Cargo.toml),CLAUDE.md, and recent git commit history viagit log. - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters are specified to isolate untrusted data during subagent analysis.
- Capability inventory: Shell command execution (
git,npx), file writing (CLAUDE.md), and delegation to subagents. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or filtering of ingested project data is described.
Audit Metadata