software-factory
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 15, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill automates task scheduling by creating and loading macOS LaunchAgents (
~/Library/LaunchAgents/ai.<slug>.loop.exec.plist) using thelaunchctlutility. This allows loops to maintain persistence and run unattended. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The instructions direct the user or agent to install a global CLI tool,
looptop, from the public NPM registry (npm install -g looptop). This external tool is central to the skill's monitoring and control capabilities. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The workflow requires synchronizing state, tickets, and findings with external services including Linear and GitHub. Additionally, the skill scans local sensitive paths, such as the Obsidian vault registry (
~/Library/Application Support/obsidian/obsidian.json), to identify project state storage. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The documentation explicitly addresses "Injection propagation," a vulnerability where untrusted data from ticketing systems or web applications can poison the agent's context.
- Ingestion points: Linear tickets, GitHub issues, and application data discovered during "free-roam" testing phases.
- Boundary markers: The skill recommends using "frozen specs" and "one-task-per-iteration" scoping to mitigate influence.
- Capability inventory: The system has access to CLI tools (
npm,launchctl,gh), file system writes, and external network APIs. - Sanitization: It advises inspecting content at communication boundaries and treating tool output as untrusted data.
Audit Metadata