nuke-sprint
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data, such as user-supplied task descriptions and existing repository files, without defining specific sanitization or boundary markers. This creates an indirect prompt injection surface where malicious instructions embedded in a project's source code or task briefs could influence the agent's behavior during the build or validation phases.
- Ingestion points: User-provided task text, brief files (via path-to-brief), and repository content skimmed during the
CALLandRESEARCHphases (SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify the use of delimiters or 'ignore embedded instructions' warnings when interpolating external content into agent prompts.
- Capability inventory: Across its workflow, the skill has the capability to write to the filesystem and execute shell commands resolved from repository manifests.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of validation or filtering for data ingested from the repository or user input.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill is designed to automatically resolve and execute shell commands based on local repository manifests like
package.json,pyproject.toml, orCargo.toml(references/stack-adapters.md). While this is a standard requirement for a development tool to run tests and linters, it provides an execution path for arbitrary commands if a repository's configuration files are maliciously modified.
Audit Metadata