plannotator-annotate
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 27, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_CONTEXT_INJECTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_CONTEXT_INJECTION]: The skill uses the dynamic context execution syntax (
!command) inSKILL.mdto runplannotator annotate $ARGUMENTSimmediately when the skill is loaded. By directly interpolating the$ARGUMENTSplaceholder into the shell command, the skill is vulnerable to command injection. An attacker or malicious input could include shell metacharacters (e.g.,;,|,&) to execute arbitrary commands on the host system. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill demonstrates an attack surface for indirect prompt injection by processing external content without proper isolation.
- Ingestion points: The output of the
plannotatorcommand is loaded directly into the agent's prompt context inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: There are no delimiters (e.g., XML tags or block quotes) or instructions to the agent to disregard embedded commands within the tool output.
- Capability inventory: The agent is explicitly instructed to "Address the feedback" and perform work based on the annotations, giving the external content direct control over the agent's subsequent actions.
- Sanitization: No sanitization or validation is performed on the output returned by the external tool before it is processed by the agent.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's primary function is to execute the
plannotatorCLI tool. While this matches the stated description, the lack of input validation on the arguments passed to this command creates a security risk.
Audit Metadata