arena
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 20, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill describes a process where a parent agent aggregates and 'grafts' content from multiple 'candidate' sub-agents. This pattern creates a vulnerability to indirect prompt injection, where a malicious or compromised sub-agent could include instructions in its output intended to manipulate the parent agent's decision-making during the synthesis phase.\n
- Ingestion points: Rationales, artifacts, and judge recommendations generated by sub-agents in Phase B, C, and E (SKILL.md).\n
- Boundary markers: The instructions do not require the use of explicit delimiters or 'ignore' instructions to isolate untrusted candidate data from the parent agent's instruction stream.\n
- Capability inventory: The workflow involves spawning background sub-agents and performing file system operations (reading/writing to /tmp/arena-* paths).\n
- Sanitization: The skill does not provide instructions for sanitizing, escaping, or validating the data extracted from sub-agents before it is integrated into the final synthesized result.
Audit Metadata