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Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data in the form of caller files and diffs. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious instructions hidden in comments or code strings could influence the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: The skill ingests data via the 'Scope' section and Step 1 in
SKILL.md, which includes 'caller's files or diff' and the 'working tree'. - Boundary markers: No explicit boundary markers or 'ignore embedded instructions' delimiters are used when passing the scope to the subagent or processing it locally.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant modification capabilities, including deleting code paths (Step 3), implementing root-cause fixes (Step 4), and spawning subagents (Step 1).
- Sanitization: No sanitization, escaping, or validation of the ingested code content is performed before it is analyzed by the AI model.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: While intended for maintenance, the skill is instructed to perform direct code modifications (deleting dead paths, dropping parameters) based on the output of an 'aggressive' subagent. The instruction in
SKILL.mdStep 2 to delete content if a 'keep' is ambiguous increases the risk of accidental functional corruption if the agent is manipulated by the file content.
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