why
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 22, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and analyze untrusted content from various external platforms, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent's context through
gh pr view(GitHub PR bodies),get_issue(Linear tickets),notion-fetch(Notion docs), Slack threads, and Datadog logs as defined in the source playbooks inreferences/sources/. - Boundary markers: The prompt templates in
references/investigator-prompt.mdandreferences/synthesizer-prompt.mduse markdown headers and blockquotes but lack specific instructions or robust delimiters to prevent the agent from following commands embedded within the fetched content. - Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities, including
gitandghexecution, and the ability to spawn sub-agents withreadonly: falsepermissions (agent mode) to utilize MCP tools. - Sanitization: The instructions do not include any steps for sanitizing, escaping, or validating the data retrieved from external sources before it is processed by the AI models.
Audit Metadata