skills/backnotprop/pstack/why/Gen Agent Trust Hub

why

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 22, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and analyze untrusted content from various external platforms, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks.
  • Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent's context through gh pr view (GitHub PR bodies), get_issue (Linear tickets), notion-fetch (Notion docs), Slack threads, and Datadog logs as defined in the source playbooks in references/sources/.
  • Boundary markers: The prompt templates in references/investigator-prompt.md and references/synthesizer-prompt.md use markdown headers and blockquotes but lack specific instructions or robust delimiters to prevent the agent from following commands embedded within the fetched content.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities, including git and gh execution, and the ability to spawn sub-agents with readonly: false permissions (agent mode) to utilize MCP tools.
  • Sanitization: The instructions do not include any steps for sanitizing, escaping, or validating the data retrieved from external sources before it is processed by the AI models.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 22, 2026, 08:58 PM