pcb-product-render
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 29, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute shell commands and scripts to perform PCB exports and rendering tasks. * Evidence: Uses
kicad-cli pcb export stepandkicad-cli pcb export glbto generate 3D assets. * Evidence: Invokes project-specific shell scripts (build/product-renders/export_board_3d.sh) and Python scripts (build/product-renders/build_product_scene.py) located within the user's workspace. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external, potentially untrusted project data while possessing the capability to execute commands. * Ingestion points: Reads
.kicad_pcbfiles and DRC reports (build/render-review/drc-latest-render.rpt) to guide the rendering process. * Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded content are used when processing board metadata or reports. * Capability inventory: The agent can run arbitrary shell scripts (.sh) and Python scripts (.py) found in thebuild/product-renders/directory, as well askicad-clitools. * Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the KiCad file content or DRC report text is performed before it influences the agent's workflow logic. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill references a local network endpoint for viewing results. * Evidence: Mentions a gallery served at
http://100.64.84.41:8765/. This address resides within the IANA-reserved range for Shared Address Space (often used by private mesh networks like Tailscale), indicating a private local deployment rather than public exfiltration.
Audit Metadata