campaign-brand

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 19, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill uses relative path traversal (../../references/CAMPAIGN_BRAND.md) to access files two levels above its own directory. While the target file appears to be a legitimate project reference, accessing files outside the skill's root directory is a practice that can be misused to access sensitive environment configurations or files if the path is manipulated.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions include the execution of a local Python script (scripts/campaign_content.py) using the command line with variable project arguments.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests and processes external data from multiple sources to define branding rules, creating a vulnerability to malicious instructions embedded in those sources.
  • Ingestion points: Reads from ../../references/CAMPAIGN_BRAND.md, campaign state, canon, verified release facts, and approved writing samples (as noted in SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit boundary markers or XML-style delimiters to separate external data from the agent's core instructions, nor do they include warnings to ignore instructions embedded within the ingested content.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses the ability to write files to the local system (06_release/social/brand_voice.json) and execute shell scripts (scripts/campaign_content.py).
  • Sanitization: No sanitization, filtering, or validation steps are defined for the ingested text before it is used to influence the agent's behavior or passed to the validation script.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 19, 2026, 08:40 AM